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Abstract
The present study investigates how family firms respond to disruptive industry 
changes. We aim to investigate which factors prevent or support family firms’ adop-
tion of disruptive innovations in their industry and which mechanisms lead to more 
or less successful coping with disruptive change. Our analysis is based on 24 qual-
itative interviews with top executives and on secondary data from an industry in 
which disruptive innovations dramatically changed the way business was generated. 
The industry in question is the mail order industry, which, in its early days, disrupted 
the retail business. When the Internet and, with it, ecommerce started to disrupt the 
industry in the late 1990s, the industry was characterized by a high proportion of 
family firms and a low level of innovativeness. While incumbent firms had been 
very successful for decades, most of them were confronted with serious turbulence 
when new entrants started changing the face of the industry. Our findings show 
that different factors impact reactions to disruptive industry change in two differ-
ent phases, namely, opportunity recognition and opportunity implementation. While 
some of the influencing factors are determined by industry factors, family influence 
may function for better or worse for incumbent firms. Specifically, we find that in 
firms with a family disruptor, a family member in a powerful position who drives 
the adoption of the new technology, hindrances can be overcome and firms tend to 
show more successful strategies when reacting to the disruptive industry change.
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1 Introduction
Disruptive developments within industries pose threats to incumbent firms (Chris-
tensen and Raynor 2003). Examples of industries that have been turned upside down 
by disruptive innovations range from film photography (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000), 
newspaper and book publishing (Gilbert 2005; Kammerlander et al. 2018), and real 
estate (Dewald and Bowen 2010) to travel brokerages (Osiyevskyy and Dewald 
2015a). More recently, digitalization has been discussed as the next global disrup-
tive challenge for incumbent firms (Kraus et al. 2019). The average age of the big 
five US tech firms, for example, is 24 years, and new startups, so-called digital uni-
corns, are waiting in the wings. More than 450 of them have already reached market 
capitalizations of more than $1 bn (CB Insights 2020). How do incumbent firms 
address this new disruptive challenge? How do incumbent family firms, which con-
stitute the majority of firms in many countries worldwide (e.g., Van den Berghe and 
Carchon 2003; Mandl 2008; Astrachan and Shanker 2003), manage to not be left 
behind? After several decades of market disruptions, these questions remain highly 
topical.
The term “disruptive innovation” embraces both technological and business 
model disruptions (Christensen and Raynor 2003) that transform existing mar-
kets, help to establish new markets, and thereby vivify economic growth (Marvel 
and Lumpkin 2007). Many research studies have investigated the determinants that 
lead to or impede disruptive innovations being addressed by incumbent firms. These 
studies adopt leadership-centered approaches and suggest that the manager’s per-
sonality (e.g., proactivity, Seibert et  al. 2001; tolerance for ambiguity, Patterson 
1999; openness to experience, George and Zhou 2001) as well as the composition 
and structure top management team (TMT) (e.g., occupational background diversity, 
Goodstein et al. 1994; network ties, Geletkanycz and Hambrick 1997; stock options, 
Sanders and Hambrick 2007 influence innovation activities. At the level of mana-
gerial levers (Crossan and Apaydin 2010), a firm’s goals and strategies (Nicholson 
et  al. 1990), organizational culture and climate (Andersen and West 1998; West 
1990), resource allocation (White 2002; O’Brien 2003), or organizational learning 
environment (Madjar et al. 2002; Crossan and Hulland 2002) have been shown to 
affect responses to disruptive innovation. Finally, business processes (Cooper et al. 
2001; Bessant 2003) seem to play an important part in shaping innovation activities.
However, the study of the organizational characteristics related to disruptive 
innovation remains underdeveloped (Cabrales et al. 2008). Family firm research 
has therefore focused on the owner family’s influence on the firm as a particular 
contextual frame for disruptive innovation management. Although many concep-
tual and empirical papers have attempted to explain differences in family firms’ 
reactions to disruptive market challenges, we still know very little about the spe-
cific factors that push family firms in one direction or another (Hu and Hughes 
2020). Specifically, a process perspective on which factors inhibit or foster reac-
tions to disruptive innovation throughout the different phases of the process (i.e., 
opportunity recognition versus opportunity implementation) has been largely 
neglected. Given the prominent role of managerial and organizational cognition 
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in these processes, a better understanding of their impact is needed that takes 
into account the heterogeneity of owner families and their respective family firms 
(Calabrò et  al. 2019; Hu and Hughes 2020). Based on these gaps in the litera-
ture, we pose the following research questions: Why do some family firms respond 
faster and more successfully to disruptive changes in their respective industry 
than others? How can family firms overcome industry- and firm-specific obstacles 
throughout the process?
Because this paper addresses “why” and “how” questions, the case study meth-
odology was considered an appropriate research strategy. The mail order industry, 
in which disruptive innovations took place in the 1990s, was selected as the industry 
setting. The core business model of the industry was once a disruptive innovation 
itself: catalogue retailing (hereafter referred to as the mail order industry) (Chris-
tensen and Tedlow 2000). In its early days, ordering goods by mail was highly inno-
vative and posed threats to established retail businesses. At the time online sales 
emerged, firms in the traditional mail order industry had decades of experience in 
logistics, purchasing, and marketing. Therefore, on the one hand, it would be reason-
able to expect that with the emergence of the Internet, these firms should have had 
a head start over new market entrants and should have grown their businesses and 
remained market leaders. On the other hand, Christensen’s (1997) theory of disrup-
tive innovation predicted the downfall of traditional mail order firms.
The present study more closely examines how incumbent firms, which were most 
often family owned and family led, coped with these changes and identifies factors 
that affected the more or less successful coping with this disruptive technology. 
Twenty-four interviews with top managers and owners of 9 German mail order firms 
who were in office during the disruptive changes in the 1990s were conducted, tran-
scribed, and structurally analyzed, supplemented by secondary data. Based on this 
analysis, we develop a process model of how family firms react more or less suc-
cessfully to disruptive industry changes and specifically focus on the differentiations 
of the two phases of opportunity recognition and opportunity implementation.
The present study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it 
responds to calls from the wider innovation literature to more closely take multilevel 
phenomena into account when researching innovation (Crossan and Apaydin 2010; 
Felin and Foss 2006). While resource-based view models, for example, are applied 
at the organizational level, psychological theories are typically applied only at the 
individual level. Our model links managerial cognition with factors at the organi-
zational level (i.e., the owner family, structures and hierarchies, resources) and thus 
provides a more comprehensive explanation for why some firms react more proac-
tively to market disruption than others. It therefore also adds to the micro-founda-
tional movement in management research in general and family business manage-
ment in particular (De Massis and Foss 2018). Furthermore, our study emphasizes 
the specific influence of managerial cognition, which is a key constitutional part of 
upper echelon theory (Hambrick and Mason 1984). Under the condition of high dis-
cretion, which is especially the case for owner family managers, executives’ char-
acteristics (and executive cognition) are correlated with strategy and performance 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990; Crossland and Hambrick 2007). Our study sheds 
more light on the nature and strength of these relationships.
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Second, by applying our study to the family firm context, an area that provides 
unique characteristics and dynamics in regard to innovation-related decisions (e.g., 
De Massis et al. 2013; Duran et al. 2016), we also add to the literature on family 
firm innovation. In doing so, we follow recent calls to investigate how family-related 
factors can be drivers of innovation (see Chrisman et al. 2015b; Ingram et al. 2016) 
and, more specifically, which family properties encourage the utilization of disrup-
tive innovation as opposed to more conservative courses of action (Hu and Hughes 
2020). This is in line with the call for a more nuanced view of the distinct chal-
lenges of family firms across different types of innovation (De Massis et al. 2015; 
Calabrò et al. 2019). Family firms are, in addition to pure financial considerations, 
particularly interested in enhancing their socioemotional wealth (SEW) (Gómez-
Mejía et al. 2007), which might be affected more strongly by disruptive than sustain-
ing innovations. This study extends research investigating the effect of executives’ 
behavior on firm outcomes (Ling et al. 2008) and research on the family firm-spe-
cific characteristics that influence important family firm outcomes, thus clarifying 
the influence of executives (Ling and Kellermanns 2010; Minichilli et  al. 2010). 
Specific characteristics of family firms, such as family image (i.e., the perception of 
being a family firm by external stakeholders) and family identity (i.e., the perception 
of being a family firm by internal stakeholders), are empirically shown to influence 
how family firms address disruptive innovations, which is in line with the expecta-
tions of Kammerlander et al. (2018) or König et al. (2013). The findings add to the 
view that family firms are a heterogeneous group (Chrisman et al. 2005; Westhead 
and Howorth 2007) and highlight specific differences that affect their innovativeness 
(De Massis et al. 2013).
2  Background
2.1  Disruptive innovation
Innovation is an important factor in the development of firms and their improved 
competitive advantage (Kraśnicka et al. 2018). In particular, disruptive innovations1 
are an essential factor for the growth and success of firms and, beyond that, national 
economies (Büschgens et al. 2013; Tellis et al. 2009). Disruptive innovations trans-
form existing markets, help to establish new markets, and thereby vivify economic 
growth (Marvel and Lumpkin 2007). Firms that develop disruptive innovations tend 
to dominate markets and increase their international competitiveness (Atuahene-
Gima 2005).
1 The term disruptive innovation (Christensen 1997) is, in the academic literature, closely related 
to other terms and concepts such as radical innovation (Leifer et al. 2001; Marvel and Lumpkin 2007; 
O’Connor and McDermott 2004; O’Connor and Rice 2001; Stringer 2000), discontinuous innovation 
(Veryzer 1998), revolutionary innovations and breakthrough innovations (Leifer et al. 2001; O’Connor 
and Rice 2001), among others, and will be used throughout this paper as synonymous.
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Initial studies of disruptive innovations concentrated on discontinuous techno-
logical innovations (Christensen and Bower 1996; Christensen 1997). However, the 
economic value of any innovation can only come to fruition through commercializa-
tion via a business model (Chesbrough 2010). A firm’s business model describes 
the transaction relations with all its stakeholders, including the value proposition for 
each (Zott and Amit 2008; Zott et al. 2011). These transactions are based on a firm’s 
unique resource base and aim to generate value for the firm (DaSilva and Trkman 
2014). From a more functional viewpoint, business models can be seen as a meta-
routine for creating and appropriating economic value (e.g., Osiyevskyy and Zargar-
zadeh 2015; Zott et al. 2011; Zott and Amit 2008; Chesbrough 2007).
Hence, the notion of disruptive innovation must be broadened to embrace new 
business models along with new technologies, products, services, or R&D processes 
(Chesbrough 2007). Christensen and Raynor (2003) therefore extended the concept 
of disruptive innovation to include disruptive business models, uniting both techno-
logical and business model disruptions under the umbrella term “disruptive innova-
tion” (Christensen and Raynor 2003).
More recently, disruptions have been acknowledged as a process of the “evolution 
of [the disruptive] product or service over time” (Christensen et al. 2015, p. 6) rather 
than an outcome, introducing a temporal facet to the discussion. There are many 
proposed process models for innovation in the literature (e.g., Frankenberger et al. 
2013), which, in its simplest form, can be reduced to the two steps of exploring and 
exploiting (Schneider and Spieth 2013). Strategic entrepreneurship emphasizes the 
need to detect and recognize (i.e., explore) early opportunities and related challenges 
(Ireland and Webb 2007, 2009; Ketchen et al. 2007). Subsequently, in the exploita-
tion phase, firms need to address challenges in terms of resistance to new routines 
(Holcomb et al. 2009; Ireland and Webb 2007), to respond to changing sources of 
value creation by reconfiguring their established ways of doing business (Amit and 
Zott 2010; Alvarez and Busenitz 2001) and to reallocate existing resources to help 
the new business grow (O’Reilly and Binns 2019). Thus, opportunity recognition 
(i.e., exploration) and implementation (i.e., exploitation) are conceptually different 
given the evolutionary phase of disruption.
Why some firms are more willing and able to recognize emerging disruptions 
and respond to them than others is of central interest in the academic literature. 
There have been different explanations, including the economic dilemmas incum-
bents face such as cannibalization of existing revenue streams (Christensen 1997), 
cognitive biases such as threatened mental models or identities (Benner and Trip-
sas 2012; Kaplan and Tripsas 2008; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000), behavioral aspects 
such as being trapped by core rigidities and organizational myopia (Danneels 2011; 
Leonard-Barton 1992; Levinthal and March 1993), and traits such as the innovation 
orientation and risk propensity of top management members (Kraiczy et al. 2015).
Opportunity recognition and the development of new organizational capabilities 
in response to disruptive changes is, to a large extent, driven by managerial cogni-
tion (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). Researchers contend that executives of incumbent 
firms act with a fixed mindset, are unable to conceive of the opportunity offered 
by disruptive innovation and, hence, tend to display strong resistance (e.g., Chris-
tensen 1997; Gilbert 2005). The nascent disruptive business model might contradict 
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managerial beliefs about success factors in the industry (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000), 
resulting in strong opposition from executives. Similar arguments have been devel-
oped in the business model innovation literature (Amit and Zott 2010), demonstrat-
ing that conflicts between the key aspects of established and new business models 
(novelty, lock-in, complementarities, and efficiency) can hamper opportunity recog-
nition. Others note potential cognitive conflicts between traditional and new busi-
ness models (Chesbrough 2010; Gilbert 2005), which are dispositional in nature 
and act as filters to select only the information related to the firm’s dominant logic 
(Bettis and Prahalad 1995). Hence, when analyzing the determinants of incumbent 
behavior in response to emerging disruptive innovation, managerial cognition and 
decision making should play a major role (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000; Benner and 
Tripsas 2012).
In addition to the firm’s executives, the success of disruptive innovations requires 
multiple facilitators both outside and inside the firm (Yang et al. 2014), who may 
hold informal or formal innovation positions. For example, innovation managers ful-
fil the role of the relationship and process promotor or a combination of both with 
the champion (Maier and Brem 2018). Various authors have proposed theories about 
the facilitators or promoters of this type of innovation (Howell and Higgins 1990; 
Howell et al. 2005).
Leadership and facilitation do not occur in a vacuum and need to be analyzed 
in the organizational context in which they take place (Porter and McLaughlin 
2006; Dinh et  al. 2014). Managerial levers such as a firm’s organizational struc-
ture (Damanpour and Gopalakrishnan 1998), learning environment (Aragón-Cor-
rea et  al. 2007), culture (Tellis et  al. 2009), resource base (Keupp and Gassmann 
2013), or climate (Liu et  al. 2017) have been shown to influence the recognition 
and implementation of disruptive innovation (for an overview of the literature, see 
Crossan and Apaydin 2010). Recently, researchers of the disruption phenomenon 
have devoted particular attention to the situational determinants of established firms’ 
responses to ongoing disruptive innovation—namely, the opportunity- or threat-
related framing of disruptive business model innovation in the minds of managers 
of incumbent companies (Osiyevskyy and Dewald 2015b; Dewald and Bowen 2010; 
Gilbert 2005).
2.2  Disruptive innovation and the family firm
It is generally accepted that family involvement in ownership, management, and 
governance affects family firm innovation (Carnes and Ireland 2013; Chrisman et al. 
2015b). However, research findings on the family-specific antecedents that affect 
innovation inputs, processes, and outcomes (Carnes and Ireland 2013; König et al. 
2013) are inconsistent, especially in relation to innovation outputs (Urbinati et  al. 
2017).
Review articles and meta-analyses (e.g., Calabrò et al. 2019; Duran et al. 2016; 
Röd 2016; De Massis et al. 2013) have diligently itemized the different success and 
hindering factors for adopting innovation in family firms and have engaged in draft-
ing a more comprehensive and conceptually structured picture of the research field. 
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These reviews show that family firms possess specific qualities that have a positive 
influence on the reaction to innovation while at the same time they show charac-
teristics that are detrimental to innovation. Negative aspects that constrain family 
firm innovation might include their conservative posture (Habbershon et al. 2003), 
organizational rigidity (de Vries 1993), risk aversion (Morris 1998), willingness to 
maintain control of the firm (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007) and limited propensity to use 
investment capital to fund innovation projects (Block et al. 2013). On the positive 
side, because utilizing disruptive innovations is inherently financially unattractive, at 
least in the short term (Kammerlander et al. 2018), the typical long-term orientation 
and involvement of multiple generations in the firm foster innovation adoption (e.g., 
Craig and Dibrell 2006; Llach and Nordquist 2010; Zahra et al. 2004). In addition, 
family culture and familiness are acknowledged as possible sources of competitive 
advantage for innovation since these resources are difficult to duplicate (Zahra et al. 
2004), creating a climate of trust and shared goals (Dibrell and Moeller 2011).
Integrating different innovation levels (i.e., sustaining or disruptive) blurs the 
picture even more and adds to the already existing complexity and ambivalence of 
family influence on family firm innovation. A recurring finding in the wider fam-
ily firm innovation literature is that family firms innovate incrementally rather than 
radically (Calabrò et al. 2019; Nieto et al. 2015; Roessl et al. 2010) and have less 
incentive to pursue disruptive innovations (Gast et al. 2018; Kraus et al. 2018). It 
is suggested that this is because family firms tend to focus on SEW preservation 
(Filser et al. 2018), avoid risk-taking to protect wealth (De Massis et al. 2014), have 
poorly developed innovation capabilities (Sciascia et  al. 2015), and exhibit family 
entrenchment (Anderson and Reeb 2003) and family orientation lock (Herrero and 
Hughes 2019).
From a family firm resource view (Sirmon and Hitt 2003; Uhlaner et al. 2013), 
it is argued that under conditions of limited financial resources, family firms will 
focus on innovation strategies with a short-term return horizon instead of disruptive 
innovation strategies that require a long-term return horizon (Sharma and Salvato 
2011; Singh and Gaur 2013). Furthermore, family firms possess the social capital 
to react quickly to innovation opportunities and to tolerate a degree of risk in doing 
so, which creates an advantage for disruptive innovation activities (Mani and Lakhal 
2015; Zahra 2003). However, other studies have found that family social capital 
might also cause a limited perspective that prevents new resources and novel infor-
mation, which are essential for adopting disruptive innovations, from entering the 
family firm (Herrero and Hughes 2019).
The ability and willingness paradox suggests that the availability of resources 
affects the ability of a family firm to respond to innovations (De Massis et al. 2014). 
The most frequently discussed resource constraints relate to financial resources, 
human resources, social capital, and firms’ knowledge and experience, which allow 
family firms to pursue the strategic direction in question (De Massis et  al. 2014; 
Cucculelli et  al. 2016). While ability positively influences disruptive innova-
tion in family firms, the willingness to do so is also of great importance (Chris-
man et  al. 2015a). Owner families’ willingness to respond to market disruptions 
has been shown to be especially influenced by SEW considerations, ranging from 
the two extremes of acting conservatively and creating a risk-averse organizational 
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decision-making culture (Miller et al. 2015) to starting to acquire resources to inno-
vate (Brinkerink and Bammens 2018; Cucculelli et al. 2016) and pursing disruptive 
innovation. Furthermore, incumbents might be willing to respond to disruptive chal-
lenges but are affected by cognitive mechanisms and shared cognitive schemes that 
are inherently inadequate for making sense of disruptive innovation (Weick 2001; 
Kaplan 2011). In this context, a recent study proposed that organizational identity 
drives responses to disruptive innovations (Kammerlander et al. 2018). Specifically, 
the combination of both domain- and role-identity driven interpretations of disrup-
tive developments leads to faster responses and more comprehensive adoptions of 
disruptive innovations (Kammerlander et al. 2018).
Besides resource based arguments and ability/willingness considerations, the 
SEW perspective has gained momentum in explaining innovation behavior of fam-
ily firms. In short, family firms are described as organization with inseparable ties 
between an owner family and the firm (Dyer and Whetten 2006). They value affec-
tive utilities beyond financial objectives (Gómez-Mejía et  al. 2007). Those affec-
tive utilities come in different forms, including the ability to exercise family influ-
ence, preservation of family reputation and dynasty, and the satisfaction of needs for 
belonging, affect, and intimacy (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007). In an attempt to structure 
the different affective needs of family firms Berrone et  al. (2012) proposed a five 
dimensional framework (FIBER model). According to this, owner families strive to 
protect family control and influence over the firm (F), identify with the firm, for 
example with the firms traditions (I), have binding social ties with their stakeholders, 
like customers or suppliers (B), are emotionally attached to the business (E) and are 
bond to the firm through a dynastic succession intention in the sense that they want 
to handing business over from one generation to the next, keeping family heritage 
and tradition in the longer-term (R). This so-called socioemotional wealth is what 
gives family firms their distinctiveness and frames their decision-making processes. 
First studies argue that family firms in their focus on SEW preservation protect their 
family legacy and avoid pursuing disruptive innovations that have a strong tendency 
to harm such a legacy (De Massis et al. 2016). On the other hand, family firms can 
sometimes engage in disruptive innovation to gain long-term benefits without losing 
family control (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2005). More recently, SEW has been 
suggested to play a moderating role on the influence of a family firm’s resources and 
innovation (Weimann et al. 2020). However, the specific factors that drive SEW in 
one direction or another remain an open question in the literature (Veider and Mat-
zler 2016).
In summary, although a plethora of studies and insights into the peculiarities of 
innovation management in family firms exist, important gaps remain. Notably, schol-
ars should more explicitly take into account the heterogeneity of innovation when 
investigating family firm innovation (De Massis et al. 2015) and should scrutinize 
the different family firm-specific factors that influence their reaction to disruptive 
versus sustaining innovation (Calabrò et  al. 2019). This is important because dis-
ruptive innovation is substantially different from incremental innovation (Bouncken 
et al. 2018; Dewar and Dutton 1986). In this context, it is fruitful to delve deeper into 
the cognitions of the owner-manager because of her/his peculiar managerial power 
due to the more unified governance structures in family firms (Chen and Hsu 2009; 
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Zahra 2005). These managerial cognitions have been largely ignored in research on 
reactions to market disruptions in family firms. Moreover, existing research has paid 
little attention to the temporal evolution of innovation (Gagné et al. 2014; Sharma 
et al. 2014). Thus, it is important to differentiate the determinants of innovation in 
family firms, at least between the opportunity recognition and opportunity imple-
mentation phases. Finally, although intensively discussed in the wider innovation 
literature (e.g., Howell et al. 2005; Markham and Aiman-Smith 2001; Tushman and 
Katz 1980), the role of facilitators should be explored more precisely (Calabrò et al. 
2019) because facilitators may be a crucial element in explaining the heterogeneity 
of reactions to the innovation paradox (Chrisman et al. 2015a).
3  Method
Case studies are empirical inquiries that investigate a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, particularly when the boundaries between the phenome-
non and the context are not clearly evident and appear in different forms (Yin 2014). 
Because this paper addresses “why” and “how” questions, the case study methodol-
ogy was considered an appropriate research strategy.
3.1  Industry setting
As an industry setting for our multi-case study, we chose the German mail order 
industry. The mail order business once represented a disruptive innovation to the 
retail sector (Christensen 1997). Furthermore, the mail order business represents a 
form of retailing that has grown significantly due to e-commerce and has gained 
importance in the last few years. Broadly speaking, mail order retail can be defined 
as a method of buying products that are received by mail. The mail order business 
originated in the late 19th century. In the US, Aaron Montgomery Ward and his 
competitor Warren Sears published their first catalogues in 1872 and 1888, respec-
tively (Britannica, britannica.com/biography/Montgomery-Ward, online; Sears, 
searsarchives.com, online). Examples of traditional mail order firms in the US 
include Sears Roebuck, J.C. Penney and Spiegel. In Europe, examples include La 
Redoute (France) and Littlewoods (Great Britain). We refer to firms that began as 
purely online players in the mail order industry as new entrants. Examples of new 
entrants are Amazon (US) and Alibaba (China).
What makes the mail order business a very interesting case for our investigation is 
that it was dominated by family firms, which were considered to have a conservative 
business approach (Habbershon et al. 2003). Furthermore, despite being confronted 
with the same industry challenges (i.e., the rise of the Internet and the establishment 
of new entrants such as Amazon) that made the industry setting homogeneous, there 
was considerable heterogeneity in the management of different mail order firms, 
ranging from owner-led companies to those with family-external management struc-
tures. Because we are especially interested in the impact of differing managerial 
cognition, this makes the industry a potentially fruitful field of exploration. Finally, 
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the then-incumbent firms mastered the challenges posed by the Internet and the ris-
ing competition of new dominant market players differently. Currently, there are still 
some incumbents acting prosperously in the market, while others were pushed aside, 
left the industry, or ceased business.
3.2  Case selection
Researchers should apply a deliberate, theoretical sampling approach according to 
their research case (Eisenhardt 1989). Theoretical sampling can be understood by 
the way cases are chosen because they are particularly suitable for illuminating and 
extending relationships (Eisenhardt 1989). We focus our investigation on mail order 
companies in Germany. We define family firms following the definition of Chua 
et al. (1999). Top management in these firms may comprise members of the fam-
ily, non-family managers or a board consisting of both groups. The firms differ with 
respect to how successfully they dealt with the emergence of the Internet (some even 
ceased to exist) and their product range (some are specialized, while others are uni-
versal mail order firms). Table  1 shows an overview of the cases included in the 
study. As we gained access to both more and less successful former incumbents in 
the mail order industry, we were fortunate to be able to base our analyses on a het-
erogeneous sample not only in terms of management structures but also in terms of 
the success in dealing with the disruptive industry change.
3.3  Data collection
As recommended by Eisenhardt (1989), we use different data sources to develop 
our case studies. By using different sources of data in the data analysis and differ-
ent persons in the data collection process, the principle of triangulation is applied in 
the present study with the aim of increasing the validity of the results (Yin 2014). 
Additionally, the use of more investigators helps to build confidence in the findings 
and increases the likelihood of surprising findings (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007).
The Internet became relevant to the industry in the late 1990s, but it took dec-
ades for it to become part of the industry. We collected data on the history of the 
firms that were part of our sample and how they subsequently coped with the rise 
of ecommerce, but we focused the data collection efforts on the years between 1990 
and 2000. The time span of interest centers around when Amazon began its offi-
cial online shop and an increasing number of e-commerce firms entered the mar-
ket. We collected secondary data based on documents from this time period and 
identified managers and family members who had prominent roles in the firms at 
that time. The interviews were conducted in 2014 and 2015. Sources for secondary 
data included public websites and radio and YouTube interviews as well as mate-
rial that was distributed by the interviewed firms themselves. The collected second-
ary data comprised annual reports, firm publications, internal minutes and statis-
tics, and online and offline interviews often published as newspaper articles. We 
systematically searched for newspaper articles and similar documents by searching 
the database LexisNexis. To be included in our analysis, articles had to focus on 
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ecommerce-related topics. Additional documents were obtained from the interview 
partners (IP). An overview of the secondary data is provided in Table 1.
We conducted interviews with 24 representatives of 9 different firms and with 
industry experts who worked for different companies or had important positions 
in professional alliances within the industry. The interviewed persons were active 
members of their companies’ TMTs and decision-makers at the time the Internet and 
e-commerce emerged. All interviewees approved the recording of the interviews. 
The interviews lasted between 58 and 130 min and were transcribed immediately 
after being conducted. Some of the insights were discussed with the interviewees 
during the data evaluation period. All nine of the German firms selected were long-
term members of the traditional mail industry; four firms were among the 10 leading 
mail order firms for many years, representing a total sales volume of €19.98 billion 
in 1996 (without affiliated firms).
All IPs were assured that all their statements and provided information would 
be treated confidentially. Because the industry is rather small and anonymity was 
guaranteed, only a very brief description of the companies is provided in Table 1. 
Most of the interviews were conducted by one of the authors. To improve the quality 
of the interview data, some of the interviews were conducted by two of the authors. 
To further increase validity, multiple executives of the majority of the selected firms 
were interviewed. It seems unlikely that these varied interviewees would engage in 
convergent retrospective sense-making (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007).
The interview guideline contained questions related to the IPs’ and their firms’ 
first impressions and reactions to the Internet, the situation of the industry in gen-
eral, how business was conducted in the firms and how decisions were made at that 
time. To test whether the interview guideline was suitable for the study and whether 
all questions were understood by the IPs, two pilot interviews were conducted. 
Because of the quality of these interviews, both interviews were included in the data 
analysis process. However, some questions were adapted for the remainder of the 
interviews to provide a high level of clarity for the questions. Overall, the interview 
questions proved to be suitable for the research objectives. Due to the confidential 
nature of the interviews and the very specific information contained, the original 
data cannot be made publicly available.
3.4  Data analysis
The qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA was used for data management 
and analysis. Structured content analysis was chosen to code the data systemati-
cally. During the data analysis process, some of the interpretations were itera-
tively evaluated and discussed with the interviewed executives and other peer 
group members from the industry or business consultants (Eisenhardt 1989). As 
a starting point for data analysis, the analysis of each case (within-case analy-
sis) as a stand-alone unit is recommended to ensure that the researcher becomes 
familiar with each individual case and to “…allow the unique patterns of each 
case to emerge before investigators push to generalize patterns across cases” 
(Eisenhardt 1989, p. 539). After the within-case analysis, we aggregated the data 
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across cases. The data analysis process began with a predefinition of a code sys-
tem. A combination of deductive and inductive code development was applied. 
The code system was evaluated with research associates and tested against the 
first transcripts in a second step. We identified first-order codes, which were 
aggregated to second-order codes in the course of the process. Coding is a 
method of discovery (Miles et  al. 2013); hence, in step three, the code system 
was enhanced and adjusted. From the coding material, three overarching themes 
emerged. The coding structure and the underlying codes are shown in Fig. 1.
4  Findings
In the following, we present our findings in relation to the three overarching 
themes we identified. We identified two crucial phases between the emergence 
of the disruptive technology (the Internet and with it the opportunity to move 
on to ecommerce) and the reactions of the incumbent firms. After initial uncer-
tainty about how the new technology should be classified, increasingly clearer 
judgment developed among the incumbents over time. These changing percep-
tions were characterized by the traditional way of doing business; thus, the 
Internet was viewed as a different approach to ordering and catalogue substitu-
tion rather than a new business model. The first phase involves perceiving the 
new technology as opportunity (opportunity recognition), and the second phase 
involves implementing changes in the business that leverage the new technology 
(opportunity implementation). The phases are linked to the overarching themes 
of perception filters and entrepreneurial baggage. The third theme, which covers 
the different family firm-specific influences in the process, connects the phases.
Fig. 1  Data structure
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4.1  Perception filters
We identified perception filters as an overarching theme in our data. Perception fil-
ters hinder incumbents from perceiving the new disruptive technology as an oppor-
tunity and acting accordingly. Specifically, we identified four perception filters in our 
analysis: adhering to rules of the game, prior success, innovation culture, and split 
focus. Almost all interviewees stated that they became aware of the Internet in the 
early/mid-1990s, just around the time the first online retailers began their businesses 
in the US. However, this awareness did not mean that the executives considered the 
Internet to be relevant for their firms at that time. Their sources for awareness of 
the Internet were very different, ranging from hearing about it from colleagues or 
through the specialized press to meetings in their home country and abroad. Others 
became aware of the Internet through their trips to the US. However, it appears that 
with a few exceptions, there was only a small degree of entrepreneurial alertness 
among executives in established mail order firms. Business was further character-
ized by a low degree of change and slow, constantly reoccurring catalogue cycles 
instead of rapid change and adaptation. The main catalogue was like a metronome 
determining the beat and, thus, the pace of the industry.
Rules of the game Our data show that the incumbents perceived rules about how 
to do business and acted based on these rules. From the beginning, the new entrants 
played according to their own—and different—set of rules. From the perspective of 
the incumbents, these rules were new. In addition to having the courage to resist the 
usual market practices, new entrants were, thanks to the capital available, in a posi-
tion to redefine the rules of the market to their own advantage.
IP 23: Amazon wouldn’t adhere to anything.
IP 22: They introduced new facts to the whole industry.
IP 24: E-commerce is a business model that frequently follows completely dif-
ferent rules.
It is also interesting to note that some of the interviewees argued that closeness 
between traditional mail order and e-commerce was perceived, but that closeness 
did not exist in reality. This perception existed because in both business models, cus-
tomers were served via distance selling by utilizing similar systems and processes 
such as logistics. As such, Internet selling was perceived simply as an extension of 
the existing business and therefore was to be managed by applying the same rules as 
those for the existing business.
IP 23: If you take a closer look, at marketing for example, then e-commerce is 
actually much more oriented toward retail than the mail order business. Why? 
Because the mail order business has completely different lead times, com-
pletely different periods of time in which selling prices are fixed by advertising 
material. You have to decide on a much longer range, you have to guarantee 
much longer delivery capabilities. In addition, behind all that lies a model for 
pricing and the supply chain, whereas in the retail sector and online, you can 
react by the hour. That is why it is and why it was wrong over the past years 
that people believed that e-commerce was a continuation of traditional mail 
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order business. That is only correct to a certain extent, and in the end, the win-
ners in e-commerce are not the traditional mail order firms because the differ-
ence is much greater in time-to-market, in pricing, in resources.
Prior success Figures and statements in annual reports reflected the successful 
economic situation and how the investigated companies assessed themselves (e.g., 
double-digit growth in sales from 1997 to 1999 at “Foxtrott”, double-digit growth 
in EBIT at “Elite” Group, + 21%). At the same time, some incumbents considered 
themselves market leaders. Thus, most executives gave top priority to securing their 
existing business. They were not willing to devote considerable financial or human 
resources and time and management attention to the emerging Internet “issue”.
IP 19: Here too, we did not have (…) these new competitors in focus and did 
not regard them as serious competition; on the contrary, we said we will leave 
them behind. If we put our foot down, we can overtake them.
“We were the best”: in this way, different company leaders characterized the self-
esteem of traditional mail order businesses at the end of the 1990s. They were eco-
nomically successful and associated this feeling with being correct in their choice of 
strategy, procedure and decisions. Their previous successes justified their strategies 
and business models.
IP 3: We earned a lot of money then.
IP 20: A lot of people earned good money and were sure and they didn’t 
believe in that thing with the Internet.
IP 15: The company grew fantastically via this mechanism. Well, basically, 
there wasn’t any pressure to justify a different kind of behavior than what one 
was already doing.
Innovation culture Overall, innovations in the industry were rare, and an innova-
tive mentality did not substantially exist in the established mail order companies. 
The view that innovation had nothing to do with the business was even occasionally 
expressed. In many cases, innovations were understood as new trends in the product 
range.
IP 4: Well, the industry is a relatively old industry; therefore, the number of 
innovations is probably disproportionate to other companies, other industries.
IP 15: Yes, that is simply the question: Is it a major task for retailers to be 
innovative? And, if so, what does that mean?
The level of innovation of the industry was considered rather low and less devel-
oped. Although the mail order industry views itself as considerably more innova-
tive than shop retailers, the mail order industry as such is viewed as less innovative 
overall.
IP 11: I can’t really think of any really big innovations in the mail order busi-
ness.
IP 16: The mail order business is not really innovative. You see that my prog-
nosis is not good for this patient.
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Various reasons for the stated views were provided: there was doubt concern-
ing whether generating innovation was a primary task of the mail order business 
at all; the degree of innovation is limited due to a lack of capital; and a traditional 
industry such as the mail order business has difficulty being innovative per se.
Some mentioned examples of innovation in the industry were topics such as 
the means of improving the costs of order entry and customer care, for instance, 
by setting up call centers, the introduction of an own-parcel service, improve-
ments in logistics to reduce delivery times, collective ordering systems or pay-
ment by installments. Examples of innovative companies in the traditional mail 
order industry are Foxtrott, Bravo and Echo. These companies addressed the 
issue of the Internet at an early stage and operated their business models from the 
beginning as multichannel businesses or, as in the case of Foxtrott, were consid-
ered to have “better management practices” (IP 19).
By contrast, the assessment of a firm’s own innovation culture shows a differenti-
ated picture. Some of the interviewees described their own stance toward and deal-
ings with innovations as weak and defined their character as cautious and reactive.
IP 2: The basic attitude was very negative. Negative….well, the right expres-
sion is conservative.
IP 9: You let the others advance and look to see how that develops and then 
jump in at a later stage.
In other companies, the approach to innovation was characterized by a type of 
trial-and-error culture in which many things were tested and in which employees 
were explicitly encouraged “to make mistakes” to some extent. Moreover, passion 
and pleasure for new things were a driving force for a culture of enthusiasm for 
innovation.
IP 11: Think of new mistakes so that old mistakes don’t get repeated.
IP 24: (…)people in our company are driven by a passion for new ideas.
IP 15: (…) individual employees or those responsible were constantly asked 
to think about how to improve processes, how to achieve leaner manage-
ment, how to accelerate things. That was a permanent task, and people also 
carried it out.
However, a positive climate for innovation existed in only a minority of the 
firms in the industry. Considering innovation to be simply “none of our business” 
characterized the way most companies treated innovation in general and the Inter-
net and e-commerce specifically.
Split focus As already indicated, the executives of traditional companies ran 
predominantly successful businesses that occupied most of their attention. 
Numerous interviewees felt impaired and burdened by, on the one hand, having 
to focus on a good, assessable business and, on the other hand, having to devote 
time and attention to the new Internet phenomenon. There was a persistent con-
flict related to the allocation of resources. It was clear that the existing business 
should not be neglected; nevertheless, firms became aware at some point that it 
was necessary to assign both time and money to the Internet.
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In addition to focusing on their daily business, incumbents were often occupied 
with other strategic topics that determined the focus of their management and the 
use of financial and human resources. These interests included, for example, the 
promotion of internationalization strategies, generational change and going public 
(Bravo), expanding logistic capacities (Delta, Bravo) or improving processes (Fox-
trott, Hotel).
4.2  Entrepreneurial baggage
The second overarching theme we identified is the entrepreneurial baggage the 
incumbents carried. This factor was especially important when implementing the 
new possibilities of the Internet into the business model. Our data show that finan-
cial limitations, existing customers, and structures and hierarchies were important 
drivers of how the firms dealt with the change.
Financial limitations For the incumbent firms, setting up structures for the new 
ecommerce channel meant they had to make large investments. Several IPs stated 
that not only was the setup of these structures expensive, but at the same time, their 
existing businesses had to continue running and developing because it was not yet 
foreseeable whether e-commerce would truly be successful. Therefore, companies 
avoided taking excessive risks by allocating too many resources to a still-unknown 
business. The compensation incumbents had originally hoped for (i.e., substitution 
of expensive catalogues with comparably cheaper contact via the Internet) could 
not be realized within a short time frame. At the same time, additional costs were 
incurred by the companies for the establishment and operation of, for example, 
online platforms and further marketing costs. Consequently, on the cost side, the 
incumbents could not compete with the new market entrants.
The interviewed executives were aware and occasionally jealous of the generous 
capital endowment some of the new entrants enjoyed and benefited from. According 
to the opinion of many of those interviewed, the main reason why new entrants were 
able to grow so quickly was because they had easy access to capital via venture capi-
tal (VC) funding or stock market flotation. To some executives from traditional mail 
order firms, it appeared that apart from a good story and high growth rates, little was 
required in the early years of the Internet to attract and impress investors.
IP 16: … investors inflated start-ups and business founders too quickly and 
with too much hot air. Those people accepted too high valuations too quickly 
for firms that really just consisted of a few PowerPoint slides, a few computers 
and 5 clever guys.
In contrast to the established companies, whose investments had a payback time 
within a certain period, there seemed to be no time pressure as such for new entrants 
to show profits.
IP 10: Of course you have to invest—either in a brand you don’t have yet or, 
if you have a strong brand, in shifting to another business model or to another 
sales channel. But you have to invest. And in an expanding market, you can’t 
just turn around after a year saying, “Hey, I want my money back”.
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IP 23: That’s obvious. There is not one [traditional] company that doesn’t 
have a clear, limited investment budget. And if you do make an investment, you 
want to see that it pays off. Some expect that to happen within one year, others 
expect three years – but sooner or later, they want to see that it pays off.
The newcomers were therefore able to finance their rapidly expanding growth 
with accordingly high capital resources and generous expectations of their investors 
in terms of payback times.
IP 5: (…) the real big difference is that this venture capital that was available 
to a large extent in the States was willing to support companies that were con-
stantly having losses.
IP 9: Today, it is easy for these guys. Today they say, I need another 50 or 100 
million. Then they grow their businesses by another 200 million. But growth 
without profits is not difficult at all; I tell you that I would be able to drive 
every business quickly if I had enough money.
Compared with many of the new entrants who were funded by VC or already had 
their stocks listed, access to capital was rather difficult for incumbents, and neces-
sary large investments were not fully made. This limitation also made it easier for 
the newcomers to expand their businesses without facing any consequential resist-
ance from the incumbents.
Structures and hierarchies The incumbent organizations showed that they were 
not well suited for timely reactions to market changes. It appeared difficult, particu-
larly in the larger mail order companies, to discuss the phenomenon of the Internet 
and its effect on their own business model in detail or collaboratively. This difficulty 
was due to the organizational structures at the time, which were described as large 
and powerful.
IP 8: Foxtrott was always extremely over-organized. Not under-organized. 
And extreme over-organization will always – in my eyes – prevent significant 
changes triggered by new impulses.
The number of board members and supervisory board members alone occasion-
ally amounted to as many as 30 people: 10 board members with clear responsibili-
ties and 20 supervisory board members, half of whom were employee and union 
representatives. In addition, there were management levels such as directors, heads 
of divisions and departments. The need for coordination between the parties was 
correspondingly high. Important topics such as the Internet are usually discussed by 
the board and the supervisory board, particularly when there is an effect on the com-
pany’s own strategy or large investments are involved.
In some of the incumbent organizations, the size of the TMT was considerable 
and appears to have weakened the antennas for innovation signals by influencing the 
complexity of communication structures and lowering the potential receptivity of 
organizational members.
The structures in the traditional mail order companies were consistently 
described as “rigid” and “sluggish” and were often characterized by political 
fighting within and outside of the top management. Although some managers 
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saw no point in promoting the Internet and new business opportunities, disputes 
continued between departments to gain control of these new areas. The strug-
gle to assume responsibility for the Internet and e-commerce was often highly 
competitive.
IP 10: To begin with, there was always a lot of arguing. IT wanted to have 
the topic: “Hey, that’s a technical thing. It belongs to us”. Then market-
ing: “No, that’s marketing; it has to do with advertising. The Internet and 
new media belong to us!” Purchasing then said, “No, actually ….we have 
to promote our products, have to make decisions here about which products. 
So it belongs to purchasing”. They were all fighting for it. Sales said, “No, 
it is a sales tool. We have to win new customers with it”.
One main reason for the power struggle was the allocation of resources within 
the scope of budget planning. Moreover, the Internet was by no means always a 
popular subject. In some companies, it was considered a nuisance.
IP 17: It was, as already mentioned, not regarded positively by other sales 
channels. There was someone sticking their oar in. We were always seen as 
troublemakers… Huge discussions in the whole company, what is it good 
for and why stir up the whole company for a little bit of business? That 
makes no sense. They were really annoying.
However, another picture of a different type of company became noticeable 
(Bravo, Echo, and Delta) in which shareholders and top management were open 
to new things and personally advanced change in their companies.
IP 15: Our shareholder—he came back from a conference and told us, 
“Okay, the Internet is now on the agenda, and we want to set it up profes-
sionally”. At least that is how it was then at Bravo.
This form of change predominantly affected those companies in which the 
shareholders were not personally represented in management or on the board 
(e.g., Golf, India, and Alpha). There was a different behavior at those compa-
nies in which the shareholders placed the Internet on their personal agendas and 
pushed it forward (e.g., Bravo, Echo, and Delta). In the latter case, there was con-
siderably more clarity and focus in terms of the Internet and e-commerce.
Overall, existing structures and hierarchies for most incumbents, particularly 
the big players, had a negative effect on their success in addressing the new 
topic of e-commerce and the Internet in general. However, two factors helped to 
decrease this barrier. First, smaller firms with fewer board members were able to 
react more quickly to changes in the environment. Second, and more importantly, 
at firms in which a powerful family member showed great interest in the new 
topic, internal resistance could be overruled.
Existing customers Incumbents considered their repeat customers to be key 
drivers of their business because acquiring new customers is perceived as expen-
sive and associated with higher economic risks. For this reason, product ranges, 
ordering methods, types of payment and advertising material were optimized and 
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fine-tuned by incumbents to suit each of their existing customer groups. In par-
ticular, so-called impulse chains were the result of year-long tests and experience, 
and even the smallest of changes often led to incalculable and significant declines 
in demand.
Changes within the impulse chain or the advertising material occurred incre-
mentally and carefully to avoid risking a negative effect on economic perfor-
mance. Compared to new entrants, however, one incumbent was slow and had to 
bear the additional costs of Internet marketing on top of existing marketing costs.
IP 5: This step-by-step restructuring is, of course, a process that happened 
over years and years, and that’s why some pure online players were quicker 
because they started online right away.
IP 9: One wouldn’t have survived without catalogues.
IP 3: You can’t just join the online pure players by putting the whole main 
catalogue subtly onto the Internet. What will you do with the rest of your 
customers? With those 70% who are not using the Internet?
Even if an incumbent was willing to run these economically huge risks and 
serve customers solely through the Internet, this approach would not have been 
successful due to the lack of Internet access because the majority of the incum-
bents’ customers were living in rural areas with limited or even unavailable tech-
nical infrastructure to access the Internet.
IP 2: Technical difficulties in the beginning, like sufficient bandwidth and 
other access details, were one of the reasons why we didn’t get the whole 
product range placed online quickly enough.
The traditional mail order business mostly had an older and very often female 
customer base.
IP 9: We had customers similar to those of other large mail order businesses 
who were, on average, aged between 50 and 60. And there was always the 
key question: Will such customers accept this kind of medium, and how will 
they use it? Also the question: Who even has a computer or laptop at home?
In fact, households equipped with personal computers or laptops remained 
rather rare, as did fast data connections and high-performance broadband net-
works. In 1998, fewer than half of European households were equipped with 
devices, and only a negligible percentage of households had access to the Inter-
net. Only a few mail order traders had a younger customer base or a predomi-
nantly male customer base (e.g., Bravo and Echo) that was also strongly techni-
cally minded, as was the case for Bravo.
In the early days of the Internet, the lack of technical infrastructure and the 
presence of predominantly older customers who showed little enthusiasm for 
online shopping represented the general conditions under which traditional 
mail order businesses perceived the Internet. Their view was also influenced 
by the established and successful advertising and sales channels to which they 
were accustomed. It appears that incumbents were listening too much to their 
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customers’ existing needs and therefore had developed a reactive customer 
orientation.
Some incumbents did experiment with electronic media and gained experience 
in the “pre-Internet era”. This experimentation, for example, included catalogues on 
CD-ROMs within the scope of the existing business. Experiments with interactive 
TV were also initiated but were soon discontinued because the technological prereq-
uisites were too onerous and the approach was not accepted by customers.
IP 14: (…) to produce catalogues from the digital database, to produce CD-
ROMs, to produce forms from CD-ROMs that allow digital ordering.
The Foxtrott mail order company was one of the first in 1994 to publish a part 
of its catalogue on CD-ROM. This kind of multimedia shopping world was 
successful: although the first circulation totaled 50,000, almost 400,000 CD-
ROMs were issued in the Autumn/Winter season 1997/98.
Traditional mail order companies have existed for decades, and certain images 
of these companies were developed accordingly during this time, with a fair num-
ber of them becoming well-known brands. Some of the interviewees believed that 
a rapid and credible change of their existing image was unlikely and associated this 
option with high economic risks because it might scare off the existing customer 
base. Hence, they did not see themselves in a position to stretch their existing brands 
in such a way that existing customers would continue to identify with them while 
being able to appeal to new, modern target groups.
IP 10: The brands were like they were. Old fashioned. But they had an enor-
mous advantage, an enormous charm: these brands enjoyed trust from the 
population.
IP 11: Well, there was a lot of talk at the time about TV sales channels. But 
that did not really take off due to technical unavailability, and we decided not 
to continue with it. We did try to experiment, but that did not really work.
4.3  Family influence
The third theme we identified in our data was the influence of the owner family in 
the family businesses. This influence was shown externally by the image as a family 
firm and internally by the identity as a family firm. Beyond these firm-level con-
cepts, we identified what we refer to as family disrupters. These individuals played a 
prominent role in dealing with disruptive innovation.
Family firm image (external perception as family firm) Most of the incumbents 
had a very traditional image, which was also shown in their hiring processes.
IP 19: We weren’t attractive enough. That already started when you entered 
our building. “Golf” was a traditional company, that has to be said … first 
you walked past a line of ancestors, then past antlers, then a dead bear or 
something else … all the old trophies from the founder and his sons-in-law, 
and you entered a firm where tradition not only smiles at you but where you 
are actually part of it. That is not appealing to young people. As an employer, 
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we were in no way as attractive as a pure e-commerce company. That’s the 
way it is. And our company’s location also plays a role.
Most IPs regarded the firms as not very attractive for young and technically 
skilled employees, which made it difficult to find the talent that was needed. As a 
new, young and modern industry sector, Internet companies had great appeal to 
young, performance-oriented and highly skilled employees, whereas the incumbents 
were viewed as a boring and old-fashioned industry.
IP 23: The more innovative employees are likely to join the new Internet com-
panies and not the traditional mail order firms.
IP 11: These start-up firms, they have a lot of young talent who are on fire, 
who really want something, who approach the subject with a naïve impudence, 
and you don’t find these kinds of people in larger companies.
IP 5: There were the start-ups that began with a team of youngsters who were 
already IT and Internet savvy. They could start in this new world right away, 
while the process of changing our employees’ mindset was still going on.
The fact that new entrants, with their modern and young image, could acquire 
talented employees who were keen and highly skilled can be considered a competi-
tive advantage. The traditional family firm image was also evident in the customer 
perception of the brands.
IP 15: I think that’s the problem of established mail order firms in general, that 
their brands convey a dusty image that isn’t very appealing to younger custom-
ers. You can try to look and act modern, but it doesn’t work with your existing 
brand.
Family firm identity (internal perception as family firm) The incumbent firms typ-
ically identified themselves as family businesses. For them, this meant, for example, 
that sticking to the printed catalogue also meant not to having to lay off employ-
ees, whose jobs would cease to exist without the catalogue. Overall, identity as an 
“honorable business man” was important for many of them, and this perception was 
linked to refusing behavior that was demonstrated by the new entrants.
IP 5: Of course, they have a completely different business model. It is not their 
business model to build up a fashion company that makes continuous profits. 
Their model is to have a fashion company that grows very quickly, becomes 
internationalized and then to sell it with a marked up price, either to a strate-
gic investor or, if they missed out on this, if they pumped too much money into 
it, then by floating on the stock exchange. That is the business model.
Family disruptor All incumbent firms had to deal with what to make of the new 
opportunities and potential threats posed by the developments centering around 
ecommerce. The firms were very similar in regard to the point in time when they 
became aware of the new technology. The intensity with which the topic was pushed 
inside the company mainly depended on its advocates. We found that in most of 
the firms, some individuals pushed the process to move the business model toward 
online applications and testing and introducing ecommerce. How the firms reacted 
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strongly depended on who pushed the topic. The majority of the family’s external 
board members stated that they were aware of the topic but did not regard it as a 
threat. Furthermore, to most of them, the topic was not attractive because there were 
no short- or midterm gains to be made from it. However, there were exceptions to 
this. One external manager stated,
IP 10: I would come in through the front door and present my ideas, and if 
they (the board members) would kick me out, I would come back in through the 
back door.
However, these endeavors were not very fruitful. In contrast, in cases where a 
family member pushed the topic, reactions were more open. In some of the younger 
firms within the sample, members of the first generation who were still running the 
firm decided that they “just had to do it” (Delta). In other incumbent firms, next-
generation members pushed the topic, often confronted with irritated reactions by 
members of the board. In these cases, incumbent firms were better able to deal with 
industry changes (e.g., Foxtrott, Bravo).
5  Discussion
The findings of the present study provide deep insights into how incumbent firms 
coped with market disruption, in our case caused by the Internet and, therefore, 
e-commerce. Some incumbents had to cease operations. Most still exist, although 
they lost market share to new entrants. The inertia that is typically associated with 
the emergence of disruptive innovations is not inevitable (König et al. 2012). Our 
study supports this claim by showing that although the firms that were part of the 
multiple-case study were similar in many ways (all were family firms from the same 
industry and the same country), substantial differences existed in how they dealt 
with the new opportunities and risks posed by the disruptive developments. Based 
on our findings, we developed a process model of the different influencing factors 
during the two phases of opportunity recognition and opportunity implementation. 
The model is presented in Fig. 2. Based on our cross-case analysis, we found that the 
way the incumbent firms dealt with the changes and how successfully they imple-
mented these changes in their business model differed. All of them were hindered at 
least to some extent by their perception filters and entrepreneurial baggage. While 
industry factors were stable for all of them and some of the influencing factors were 
less determined by being family firms, family influence played an important role at 
many points.
The findings show that there was not one factor that determined the reaction of 
the incumbents to disruptive developments in their industry; instead, it was a com-
bination of diverse factors involving different levels of the incumbent firm that 
helped or hindered responses to emerging disruptive innovations. We thus contrib-
ute to a multilevel examination of responses to disruptive innovation (Crossan and 
Apaydin 2010; Felin and Foss 2006) by showing that perception filters, which exist 
at the individual level of the upper echelons (Hambrick and Mason 1984), can be 
detected within the opportunity recognition phase, while entrepreneurial baggage, 
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as a firm-level factor, becomes more important in the opportunity implementation 
phase. Our findings considerably extend existing research on barriers to innovation, 
which have paid almost no attention to a temporal perspective (Gagné et al. 2014; 
Sharma et  al. 2014). Because perception filters, and thus the upper echelons and 
their perception biases, play a pivotal role in the first phase of the innovation pro-
cess, measures to overcome initial innovation barriers should focus on the individual 
and not on the organizational level. Not until the individual barriers are overcome, 
do firm-level barriers come into play. These should be addressed to facilitate the 
implementation of ideas, once an opportunity is recognized.
Some of the factors influence all incumbents in the same direction, while other 
factors are more specific to some firms than to others. While we found that the prior 
success of the business influenced the reactions of all interviewees in a similar 
way, consistent with the finding that judgmental overconfidence, which is strongly 
affected by prior success, constitutes an important decision-making bias (Hilary and 
Menzly 2006) and is negatively linked to innovation activities (Herz et  al. 2014), 
the existing customer base differed. Most firms had a predominantly female, elderly 
customer base living in rural areas who did not have the technological equipment 
and knowhow to order online. In these cases, firms did not want to make changes 
that might exclude these customers. This is in line with SEW considerations sug-
gesting that family firms establish emotional ties toward their stakeholders, which 
are, although sometimes financially detrimental, not abrogated (Cennamo et  al. 
2012; Romero and Ramírez 2017). Other incumbents had a younger customer base 
that was interested in technology, which helped them to try out innovative concepts 
– even though the performance of the new technology (e.g. catalogues on CD ROM) 
was not especially good or convenient. In these cases, no decision conflict arose 
because protecting their SEW (with regard to customer relations) did not collide 
Fig. 2  Process model of determinants of family firms’ reactions to disruptive industry change
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with pursuing disruptive innovation. We add to calls for a more nuanced view of the 
challenges of family firms regarding disruptive innovation (Calabrò et al. 2019) by 
showing that distinct challenges apply to all family firms (e.g., prior success), while 
other challenges, such as existing customer bases, apply only to specific subgroups. 
Our finding challenges existing research on innovation in family firms, which pre-
dominantly focused on differences in innovation inputs, behavior, and outcomes to 
differences in family firm specific peculiarities like governance structure, SEW ori-
entation, or resource configurations (e.g., Chrisman et al. 2015b) and comparisons 
with non-family firms. Our case study analysis suggests that determinants non-spe-
cific to family firm however varying between family firms, like the existing customer 
base, might also explain much of the differences between family firms.
A factor of particular importance in the context of responses to disruptive inno-
vations in family firms is the family disruptor. In the early days of ecommerce, the 
necessary financial investments were very high, while the return was uncertain. The 
case analysis showed that a family disruptor is needed who drives the new topic and 
has formal as well as informal power to enable these investments and decisions. The 
importance of a family member involved in the top management of the company 
who pushes the new issue (in the present case, e-commerce) is in line with results 
from extant research (Duran et al. 2016; Röd 2016). Firms in which such a person 
was available were much more successful, and family firms could take full advan-
tage of their familiness (Carnes and Ireland 2013).
With a view toward the general discussion of innovation management, it has been 
proposed, especially for disruptive innovations, that boundary spanners are needed 
to import external knowledge resources and customer demands and to exploit val-
ues created by external innovators and that traditionally discussed innovation cham-
pion and troika roles (Schon 1963; Witte 1973; Hauschildt and Kirchmann 2001) no 
longer suffice (Gemünden et al. 2007). The not-invented-here syndrome and group-
think phenomena within the traditional troika may support adherence to the wrong 
innovation, which may be even worse than non-innovation. In this context, the fam-
ily disruptor might fill this specific role and help to overcome these obstacles.
Our findings are also in line with the theoretical assumption of König et  al. 
(2013) that once family firms have detected an innovation opportunity, they act more 
quickly and have more stamina. However, König et al.’s (2013) assumption that fam-
ily firms take longer to recognize discontinuous innovation is not supported by our 
data. Our results rather suggest that the speed of opportunity recognition is attrib-
uted to individual perception filters of the upper echelons and, thus, might consider-
ably vary within the family firm spectrum, depending on whether the top managers 
are more or less biased.
Another important finding is that although it is typically assumed that a lack of 
dependence on external capital is a competitive advantage of family firms (Arregle 
et al. 2007; König et al. 2013), the present results show that in such a rapidly chang-
ing environment, this financial independence can be a double-edged sword. On 
the one hand, if there is a family disruptor, financing decisions for new endeavors 
(for example, making part of the catalogue available online) are rather quick and 
uncomplicated. On the other hand, in situations in which competitors (new entrants) 
gain market share by “burning cash”, as was often the case in the early days of the 
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Internet, family firms could hardly compete because, as some of our IPs stated, it 
conflicted with their understanding of doing business. These different rules of the 
game might be a reason why the industry as a whole has been overtaken by new 
entrants. The new entrants did not adhere to the traditional players’ shared under-
standing of how to do business.
Finally, our insights add to the explanations of why there are differences in family 
and non-family firms’ responses to disruptive innovations. We know little about the 
factors that enable incumbents to change their established mindsets and to respond 
more flexibly to a disruption by establishing new routines (Gerstner et al. 2013; Gil-
bert 2005; König et al. 2013; O’Reilly and Tushman 2004). We found that entrepre-
neurial baggage, which is rooted in the existing business (Coombs and Hull 1998), 
may have detrimental effects, especially for family firms. The competitive advantage 
of many incumbents in the mail order industry was rooted in the large efforts and 
expertise invested to produce the catalogues and operate a successful business. A 
large proportion of the specific knowledge needed for these processes lost its value 
because of the increasing importance of e-commerce. Whole departments of cata-
logue retailers are concerned only with the production of catalogues. One reason 
why the traditional mail order firms remained focused on their catalogue busi-
ness longer than needed might be that as soon as the production of the catalogues 
stopped, the employees who specialized in these jobs would no longer be needed 
and would most likely have had to leave the company. Similar to the considerations 
of the existing customer base, a high SEW focus with a higher value of binding 
social ties and emotional attachment (Berrone et  al. 2012; Cennamo et  al. 2012) 
prevented incumbents from laying off these employees and modifying the firm’s 
internal competences by hiring new employees. This is in line with studies showing 
that family firms downsize less (Block 2010) and behave more socially responsibly 
toward their employees (Sanchez-Bueno et al. 2020).
5.1  Practical implications
Despite the unique situation of the mail order industry, general practical implica-
tions can be drawn from the results of the present study. First, decision makers must 
be aware that the perception of their organization of market signals is biased by per-
ception filters (Benner and Tripsas 2012). Beyond the huge information load that 
decision makers already face, globalization further aggravates the situation, making 
it increasingly less likely that the “next big thing” will occur directly on one’s own 
doorstep (Van de Vrande et  al. 2009). Decision makers therefore depend on reli-
able information channels that supply them with relevant information that is simul-
taneously as unbiased as possible (Hartman, Tower, and Sebora 1994; Nilakanta 
and Scamell 1990). External sources of information can be innovation agencies, 
conferences, and VC activities, and external networks in general can supplement 
information sources from inside the company. Second, companies should foster 
diversity in executive committees. Decision makers often have extensive experi-
ence and implicit knowledge, which is important and helpful but can also hinder 
the successful handling of new developments. Particularly in very homogeneous 
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executive committees, the risk of missing or ignoring new impulses increases (Ling 
and Kellermanns 2010; Ling et al. 2015). The results of the present study indicate 
that (comparatively) young eccentrics often pushed the new topic of e-commerce 
(including at traditional mail order companies). A balanced mixture of experience 
and impartiality may help firms integrate new perspectives and make better deci-
sions. Third, companies should aim for an innovation culture (Chandler, Keller, and 
Lyon 2000). The results of this study show that companies were more successful 
when they promoted a “trial and error” culture. The development of a company cul-
ture of this type can help to successfully address new challenges. New ideas should 
not be forced into existing structures. Although new ideas start on a small scale and 
with few financial resources, they still consume the attention and resources of man-
agement. Particularly in an environment with a clear focus on existing business and 
tough internal competition for budgets and responsibilities, new ideas often have lit-
tle chance of succeeding. Separating new activities from old activities, for example, 
by establishing a spin-off, could be a step toward success (which some of the firms 
in the sample did successfully in the past years).
5.2  Limitations and future research
The present study has several limitations that present avenues for future research. 
First, the time span that was the center of interest of the interviews dates back more 
than 15 years. The respondents’ statements might be biased by sense-making and 
other cognitive delusions due to the retrospective nature of the interviews (Merkl-
Davies et  al. 2011). This methodological issue occurs in most qualitative studies 
using interviews (Cox and Hassard 2007). We attempted to minimize biases by 
conducting interviews with several IPs in most of the firms and supplementing the 
interviews with secondary data. Although it seems hardly feasible, future research 
could address this problem by beginning the case analysis at a very early stage of the 
emergence of a disruptive technology.
Second, the sample of the respondents was very homogeneous, which had several 
advantages. Because our research strategy aimed to discover strategic processes, the 
impressions of TMT members were of the highest relevance (Hambrick and Mason 
1984). Furthermore, this kind of data provides a rare opportunity as it is difficult 
to obtain. The data collection also was focused on the German mail order indus-
try. Hence, future research including also an employee perspective and perspective 
from different national contexts could add to the perspective presented in the present 
study.
6  Conclusion
The present study uses the historic context of the advent of ecommerce disrupting 
the German mail order industry to investigate the way family firms deal with disrup-
tive industry changes. Based on this historic context, our findings provide insights 
which can help to better understand how family firms deal with future industry 
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disruptions, which have become more frequent in today’s fast changing environ-
ment. Especially a better understanding of how to groom successful family disrup-
tors provides interesting avenues for future research and management practices.
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